The mystery of the safeguards text and the India-US Nuclear agreement

By gkalyanaram

There are three developments with regard to the debate on 123 agreement (India-US Nuclear agreement) in India, and they are worthy of note –

(1) The Congress party continues to insist that the full text of the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can be shared with only the members of the government, and not with the opposition leaders. This raises may awkward questions. First, who decided that the text should be classified as “secret” — the UPA government or the IAEA? Second, the implication is that sharing the document with political leaders like Parakash Karat and Lal Krishan Advani would compromise the document’s security (but not so when sharing the document with the Ministers in the cabinet) is difficult to accept. Third, why can’t the document with the opposition political leaders in an in-camera, secure session? Finally, if Mulayam Singh Yadav (who has opposed the government for the last four years) now joins the government he will be privy to the IAEA safeguards text but not Prakash Karat who has supported government for the last four years. That is odd.

(2) However, there also seems to be some hope in the proposed text with the IAEA. Per media reports, the draft notes that India “may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.” It appears that the Indian government is seeking a way out if the U.S. (per Hyde Amendment) or some other country pulls the rug out of India’s supply of nuclear fuel and technology. That’s good news but it is unlikely that the IAEA will agree to that.

(3) The Congress party and the United Progressive Alliance government led by Mrs. Sonia Gandhi and Prime Minister ManMohan Singh will squeak through in the vote of confidence. While that may appear like good news, the narrow margin will leave everyone a bit uneasy. Such a narrow margin on such a strategic decision appears to be less than prudent. And then the political price for Congress and it allies is also likely to be fairly substantial.  Finally, the approval by the U.S. Congress remains doubtful because of the time constraints (the U.S. Congress is likely to adjourn by about September 26th) and the political dynamic (senior Democratic party leaders are not enthusiastic about the agreement — see Nuclear Non-proliferation.)

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